Abstract-Capacity and random-coding error exponent formulas are derived for a public fingerprinting (traitor tracing) game. The original media copy is available to the encoder, but not to the decoder. We derive the random-coding error exponent for a stacked binning scheme. The exponent is strictly positive at all rates below capacity. The converse part of the capacity proof is based on the Gel'fand-Pinsker technique.
I. INTRODUCTION
Content fingerprinting is one of many applications of information hiding. The same media covertext-image, video, audio, or text-is distributed to many users. A fingerprint, a mark unique to each user, is embedded into each copy of the distributed covertext. In a collusion attack, two or more users may combine their copies in an attempt to "remove" their fingerprints and forge a pirated copy. The distortion between the pirated copy and the colluding copies is bounded by a certain tolerance level. To trace the forgery back to members of the coalition, we need fingerprinting codes that can reliably identify the fingerprints of those members. Essentially, from a communication viewpoint, the fingerprinting problem is a multiuser version of the watermarking problem. In the latter problem, the attack is by one user and is based on one single copy.
Depending on the availability of the original covertext to the decoder, there are two types of fingerprinting applications: private and public. In the private fingerprinting setup, the covertext is available to both the encoder and decoder. Public fingerprinting, where the original covertext is available to the encoder but not to the decoder, has some advantages over private fingerprinting. For example, public fingerprinting does not require the vast storage and computation resources that are needed for media registration in a large database. Also, it offers the flexibility of distributed detection, e.g., a DVD player can detect fingerprints from a movie disc and refuse to play it if fingerprints other than the owner's are present.
The capacity and error exponent limits of private fingerprinting have been derived by Somekh-Baruch and Merhav [1] [2] . In this paper, we study the capacity and error exponent limits of public fingerprinting games. The specific setup we consider here is a discrete memoryless collusion channel and a detect-all decoder, which means an error is declared if not all members of the coalition are caught. A binning scheme is used in the capacity-achievability proof because, unlike in the private setup, the availability of side information to the encoder and decoder is asymmetric. To optimize the balance between the probabilities of encoding error and decoding error, we use a stacked binning scheme that we previously proposed for single-user channel coding with side information [3] . We obtain a single-letter lower bound on the random coding error exponent that is strictly positive at rates below capacity. Also, we derive a single-letter expression for capacity. The converse proof is based on the telescoping technique used by Gel'fand and Pinsker [4] .
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Public fingerprinting with side information at the encoder is modelled in Fig. 1 . Let S, X , and Y be three finite alphabet sets. The covertext sequence S = (S 1 , . . . , S N ) consists of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples drawn from a probability mass function (p.m.f.) p S (s), s ∈ S. The fingerprinting encoder generates |M| = 2 NR fingerprinted copies
Each fingerprint m corresponds to a user. Assume that the collusion size is L = 2 1 . Let M 1 and M 2 be two users selected independently and uniformly from the set M. They collude to produce a pirated copy, or forgery, Y, through an attack channel p Y|X1X2 . The decoder does not know p Y|X1X2 selected by the two colluders and does not have access to the original covertext. The decoder produces estimates
2 in attempt to catch the two colluders. We allow the encoder/decoder pair (f N , g N ) to be randomized, and the choice of (f N , g N ) is a function of a random variable known to the encoder and decoder but not to the colluders. We can think of this random variable as a secret key. Formally, the randomized code will be denoted by (F N , G N ) .
A. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables, lowercase letters for individual values, and boldface fonts for sequences. Entropy of a random variable X is denoted by H(X), mutual information between two random variables X and Y is denoted by I(X; Y ), and Kullback-Leibler for all x ∈ X such that p x (x) > 0. The conditional type class T y|x , given x, is the set of all sequences y such that (x,ỹ) ∈ T xy . We denote by H(x) the entropy of the p.m.f. p x and by I(x; y) the mutual information for the joint p.m.f. p xy . We let P(X ) and P N (X ) represent the set of all p.m.f.'s and all empirical p.m.f.'s, respectively, on the alphabet X . Likewise, P(Y|X ) and P N (Y|X ) denote the set of all conditional p.m.f.'s and all empirical conditional p.m.f.'s on the alphabet Y. We define |t| + = max(0, t).
B. Constrained Fingerprint Codes with Side Information
A distortion function d 1 : S × X → R + is defined to quantify the distortion between a fingerprint symbol x and a covertext symbol s. This definition is extended to N -vectors using d
We now define a class of codes that satisfy maximum distortion constraints (Def. 2.1).
Definition 2.1: A length-N , rate-R, randomized code with side information and maximum distortion D 1 is a triple
• M is the fingerprint set of cardinality |M| = 2 NR ;
N is the encoder mapping the covertext sequence s and fingerprint m to the fingerprinted sequence x(s, m) = f N (s, m). The mapping is subject to the distortion constraint
is the decoder mapping the received sequence y to decoded fingerprints (m 1 ,m 2 ) = g N (y).
We use randomized codes in anticipation of collusion attacks with arbitrary memory [2] ; in this paper, however, only memoryless strategies will be allowed for the coalition.
Definition 2.2:
where U ∈ U is an arbitrary auxiliary random variable. The cardinality of U is arbitrary as well. We denote by P XU|S (D 1 ) the set of feasible transmit channels.
C. Constrained Collusion Attack Channels
We define a constrained discrete memoryless collusion channel (DMCC) as follows.
and the expected distortion constraint
We denote the set of feasible DMMCs by
We pose the fairness constraint and the D 2 constraint on both colluders is based on the assumption that no colluder is willing to take more risks than the other colluders.
D. Probability of Error
In this paper, we only consider the case of detecting all colluders. An error occurs when the decoded two fingerprints do not match the fingerprints of real colluders:
The average probability of error for a deterministic code
For a randomized code the expression above is averaged with respect to p(f N , g N ). The minmax probability of error for the class of randomized codes and the class of constrained DMCCs considered is given by
Definition 2.4:
A rate R is said to be achievable if P e,N → 0 as N → ∞.
Definition 2.5:
is the supremum of all achievable rates. Definition 2.6: The reliability function for the class of randomized codes and attack channels considered is defined as
where P e,N is given in (2.5).
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main tool used to prove the random coding error exponent bound in this paper is the method of types.
Theorem 3.1: For the DMCC model (Def. 2.3), the reliability function is lower-bounded by the random-coding error exponent
Due to symmetry-p Y |X1X2 = p Y |X2X1 and p X1U1|S = p X2U2|S -either one of the first two terms in the functional J can actually be dropped. E
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(R) is strictly positive at all rates below capacity and determined by the worst type class T su1x1u2x2y . The random-coding error exponent (3.7) is achieved by conditionally constant-composition codes using a stacked binning technique and a maximum penalized mutual information (MPMI) decoder [3] . A sketch of proof appears in Sec. IV.
Theorem 3.2: For the DMCC model (Def. 2.3), the capacity is given by
where U 1 ∈ U, U 2 ∈ U, and p X1U1|S = p X2U2|S = p XU|S . The proof of the direct part of Theorem 3.2 is an immediate consequence of the achievability theorem 3.1, and the proof of the converse part is given in Sec. V.
IV. SKETCH OF PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
The encoder is the stacked random binning scheme of [3] . Let U be a finite set. We define Given a covertext sequence s and a fingerprint message m, the encoder finds in C(p s ) the smallest l such that u(l, m) ∈ T u|s . Let u = u(l, m). If no such l is available, generate u uniformly from the conditional type class T u|s . Then generate x by uniformly drawing from the optimized conditional type class T x|us (u, s). Notice that the conditional joint type T xu|s is optimized and we later will give the cost function for the optimization; and the distortion between x and s satisfies the maximum distortion constraint (2.1). This procedure is repeated for all |M| = 2 NR users. Given a forgery y, the decoder seeks a covertext type p s and a pairû 1 ∈ C(p s ),û 2 ∈ C(p s ) that maximizes the penalized mutual information criterion Without loss of generality, we assume that the two colluders have fingerprint indices (m 1 , m 2 ) = (1, 2).
Conditioned on a covertext s, an encoding error happens under either of the following two error events:
Therefore,
which vanishes super-exponentially since η N log N N . The second and third equations follow since each u(l, 1) is uniformly distributed over T u and the probability that such a vector belongs to T u|s is equal to 2 −NI(u|s) on the exponential scale. The second inequality follows from 1 + a ≤ e a . Then we have 
= min
e,1 and E c e,2 ), (4.9) where P X1U1|S = P X2U2|S = P XU|S is determined by the encoder and
Now, we bound the conditional decoding error probability in (4.9).
We distinguish five kinds of decoding error events. The sum of their probabilities is an upper bound of the decoding error probability. Let us use the shorthand
with u 1 ∈ T u(ps) , and u 2 ∈ T u(ps) . Also, to simplify the notation, let the subscript of u denote the index of fingerprints. The five kinds of error events are The proof of the converse theorem is an extension of Gel'fand and Pinsker's proof in [4] .
Let
For any rate-R encoder f N and DMCC p Y |X1X2 , we consider three inequalities. Inequality I: Due to Fano's inequality, we have
Hence,
The error probability P e is not bounded away from 0 only if
Define random variables
Due to limited space, we omit the derivation of the following inequality 
